EU External Policy, Examples of Democracy Promotion in Tunisia and Morocco by G. Taffoni
Gaia Taffoni 
PhD Candidate, Università degli Studi di Milano 
Political Studies 
 
 
EU External Policy, Examples of Democracy Promotion in Tunisia 
and Morocco 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a result of the last enlargement the EU has become a democracy promoter developing a 
series of instruments that allowed a direct action with the implementation of the political 
conditionality; in the aftermath of the Eastern Enlargement the EU established the 
Neighbourhood Policy, ENP, in order to replicate the successful strategy of democracy 
promotion with the newly countries at the borders. After the enlargement, thus, the EU clearly 
became a democracy promotion international actor and the new challenges, nowadays, are 
those countries without membership perspective of the Union.  
 
The paper proposes to analyse the effectiveness of the EU external governance in 
promoting its own model of democracy using the variables of the methodological approach 
provided by Levitsky and Way in their work on the International dimension of regime change, 
namely the linkages to the EU and the EU leverage. 
The choice to extend the Europeanization study, mostly linked to the members states and the 
accession countries, to the Neighbourhood is due to the objective of studying whether and 
under which conditions the EU is able to induce domestic changes in the absence of a 
membership perspective, that is considered to be the main tool for domestic compliance. 
The research question therefore is to evaluate if the ENP instruments are able to induce 
domestic changes that conduct to more internal democratization, to evaluate the European 
Union’s potential and main limits in promoting democracy without the main carrot, i.e. 
membership perspective, that allowed the Central and Eastern countries to great efforts 
during the enlargement process. 
Regarding the empirical analysis the paper will focus on two countries of Maghreb, namely 
Morocco and Tunisia. Those two case studies represent on one side two most similar cases for 
the objective of comparison and, on the other, are two stories of success for what concern 
internal stabilization.  
Therefore, focusing on these stories of success for what concerns internal democratic process, 
together with the variables provided by the theoretical approach of Lewitsky and Way this 
paper will test the hypothesis of the EU’s potential in promoting democratic values through 
economic linkages toward non candidate countries.  
 
The paper is composed of a first part in which the theoretical framework will be 
explained. Europeanization of third countries is not characterised by a grande theorie 
therefore an introduction on the main EU integration theories will be provided.  
A second part is dedicated to the description of the European Union and the activity of 
democracy promotion demonstrating why the EU can be defined a democracy promotion 
actor 
The Third section deals with the operational part of the paper, with the analysis of the 
independent variables, i.e. Linkages and Leverage, this will provide the first hypothesis on 
whether the EU is able to exert more impact and under which conditions.  
The last section is dedicated to the analysis of the dependent variables, in other words the 
main reforms and developments made by Tunisia and Morocco as a response of the requests 
made by Brussels.  
The empirical part will to pay attention to the causal relation between the EU requests and 
the domestic developments, this aspect will be highlighted in the conclusive chapter that will 
also provide a brief conclusion on the EU impact in promoting democracy in Tunisia and 
Morocco under the umbrella normative frame of the ENP.  
 
It is important to underline, at this stage, that the concept of Democracy is a wide one 
and consists of many different policy aspects. To define Democracy is therefore an important 
task for the purpose of this research notwithstanding all different shades in which scholars 
have categorised the concept of Democracy. The question is thus to see what is to be 
understood as Democracy that is promoted on the ENP territories.   
For the purpose of this study, when dealing with EU Democracy promotion, the research 
will rely on the EU concept of democratic values that laid the foundations for democracy 
promotion in the accession countries and nowadays within the ENP, those democratic values 
expressed in the Copenhagen Criteria form the EU’s normative identity, provided by the 
European Commission’s Action Plans and Progress Reports, in particular focusing on the 
chapters on Democracy stricto sensu, Rule of Law and Human Rights.  
 
 
 
What is “Europeanization” 
 
In order to find a definition of the theoretical framework that will be used as a lens for 
the analyses of the impact of the EU on the Mediterranean countries selected as case studies 
in this research, i.e. Tunisia and Morocco, this paper will introduce a clear explanation of what 
is Europeanization, on which theories of European integration stands, from when particular 
period scholars started to take into consideration this aspect and under which conditions the 
“European turn” happened in scholarly works. 
We can state that Europeanization is a brand new understanding of the process of 
European integration; starting from the nineties, in fact, there was a clear need to descript 
and explain EU integration in a different manner, in a way that shifted from the classical 
approaches. 
The Grand Theory of European Integration stands on Neofunctionalism and the consequent 
Intergovernmentalism paradigm that characterized the scene of the regional integration 
studies in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Neofunctionalism is described by Rosamond as a pluralist theory and early neofunctionalists 
imagined to transplant the pluralist polity from the national to the supranational level, 
Neofunctionalism was, thus, built around the assessment that an international society of 
states can acquire the procedural characteristics of a domestic political system (Rosamond, 
2000). According to the theory that originated from the assumptions of Haas, the founder 
father of Neofunctionalism, the benefits of integration, in fact, would become apparent to 
domestically located interest groups who would lobby their governments accordingly since 
integration would be promising to serve their material interests and the spill over effect 
would be an increase in support for the integration emanating from national political systems. 
But at a certain point in the journey of the European Integration the principle of 
Supranationalism was reshaped by the pivotal figure of Charles de Gaulle and his nationalist 
insurgence, after the advent of the fifth French Republic in 1958 the fundamental premises of 
the integration experienced so far were renegotiated in favour of the member states and the 
principle of Intergovernmentalism was finally introduced. 
Charles De Gaulle, according to Haas, represented something more than mere nationalists 
interests but his policy, for certain, underlined that there were some “lacks” in Haas 
theoretical formulation. That was the momentum for the appearance of the 
Intergovernmentalism critique of the Neofunctionalism assumptions, this new road was 
opened by Hoffmann and his emphasis on the importance of the national interests. He gave, 
therefore, importance to the domestic bases of interests and this allowed him to be the first 
representative of the “domestic politics approach to integration” (Rosamond, 2000). 
Hoffmann complaint against Neofunctionalism was that “the emphasis on the process led to a 
certain neglect of the context, or at least to a view of the context that may have been too 
selective”. Historical Institutionalists such as Pierson, interested in the political development 
of the European integration, argued that the Intergovernmentalist approach that focused 
mainly on the member states and their national interests was a poor perspective that was not 
able to truly understand phenomenon that actually happened at the sovranational level. 
Pierson therefore, in his work “The Path to European Integration, a Historical Institutionalist 
Perspective” underlined how the analysis needed to be shifted to the sovranational level and 
in particular to the historical developments over time rather than a simpler snapshot 
perspective.  
Neofuntionalism and the consequent, as defined by Schmitter, Neo-Neofuctionalism is thus a 
political theory of integration that asks not whether “artificial” barriers are being reduced but 
“what kind of strategy politically relevant actors are likely to adopt in a given context” 
(Schmitter, 2002). What Schmitter underlines in its revision of the Neofunctionalism theory of 
EU integration is the fact that several elements that appeared in the integration process from 
the nineties were not taken into consideration by the past Integration theories. For example 
the impact of Enlargement and the entry of new member states that imposed changes in the 
decision making rules and informal practices. 
The Neofunctionalism did not take into account the external context surrounding the regional 
integration as well as the other regional and international organizations, the European Court 
of Justice or the European agencies and institutions that developed through the integration. 
Through this lens we can understand the background from which a new approach of 
theorising European Integration sprang. 
 
The Europeanization theory stands on those two perspectives and thus it represents a 
“third step” in the EU Integration theory (Caporaso, 2007). Europeanization, in fact, takes 
from the Neofunctionalism the concept of “uploading” domestic societal preferences which 
“give birth to the various institutions and policies built at the EU level” (Graziano and Vink, 
2008), on the other hand Europeanization adopted the focus on the domestic state-related 
sources of European decision making and “their consequences on the nature of EU 
institutions and policies” from the Intergovernmentalism approach. In other words 
Europeanization seems to correct the problem of Neofunctionalism, described by Webb in 
1983, of the tight association of that model with the community method (Rosamond, 2000) 
and to consider instead the “exogenous context” of Integration as prioritized by Hoffmann in 
his critique. 
The Europeanization research agenda started with the focus on certain European policies, 
what Graziano and Vink defined as the “classic” European policies like the Environmental 
policy, Transport policy and Cohesion policy. The interest of the scholars was to determine 
the domestic implementation of those policies and, from the early 2000s, other policy where 
the EU had less weight were investigated like Social and Refugee policy (Graziano and Vink, 
2008). 
As reported by Borzel the ever-growing transfer of competences to the EU fostered the 
interests of the scholars in calling the EU integration theory back-in in order to use those 
theories for investigate how the European integration process transformed the domestic 
institutions. 
The “Europeanization turn” had another acceleration in terms of analytical tool after the big-
bang Enlargement process of 2004, in fact as Borzel argues “the Eastern Enlargement created 
an unique opportunity to test the various approaches that had emerged to account for the 
conditions and causal mechanisms through which the EU triggers domestic change” (Borzel, 
2010), what scholars could now analyse was the domestic impact and the Transformative 
Power of the Acquis Communautaire. 
As Sedelmeier argues the domestic impact of the EU is not confined, as one may think, mainly 
to the member states but it also happens when the EU became engaged to an “unprecedented 
extent in a regular monitoring and assessment” (Sedelmeier, 2011) of the adjustment efforts 
of the candidate countries. In other words if the nineties paved the way with the formalization 
of a coherent and comprehensive EU external action, the big-bang Enlargement created the 
theoretical environment that introduced the concept of Europeanization. 
When considering Europeanization academics relates to the question of the domestic 
impact produced by the EU on member states, candidate countries but also on those countries 
beyond the EU borders. More deeply Europeanization beyond the borders is conceived to be 
the promotion of a certain model, a model represented by the EU that can be summarised in 
“regionally integrated system of liberal democracies” (Shimmelfenning, 2007), it is this model 
that the EU tends to promote in the Neighbourhood countries in order to create an 
environment that mirrors the European norms, values and institutions and this is functional 
to the objective of security but also to the aim of reducing adaptation and information costs. 
What really distinguish Europeanization from a pure European integration perspective is the 
focus on the domestic impact. Europeanization takes origin from the debate over the regional 
integration and adds a new dimension of investigation which is the overcoming of the 
European orientation of the already mentioned integration theory and its focuses primarily 
on a new “target” which is the domestic level (Graziano, 2011). The theoretical efforts of 
Europeanization is thus to bring the domestic paradigm into the analysis of European 
integration process, by doing so Europeanization will explain the domestic impact of a certain 
European policy. This different perspective of analysis, that enables to measure the 
“transformative power” of the EU, even outside its borders, needs a structured approach of 
research. As Vink and Graziano put in their work “Europeanization as a new Research 
Agenda” there is the need to start from the domestic level, analyse how policies or institutions 
are formed at the EU level and then determine the effects of political challenges and pressures 
exerted by the diffusion of European integration at the domestic level; this is the so called 
“Bottom-up-down” design which is probably the only guarantee for a due consideration of the 
European factor and how actually European policies, rules and norms are affecting the 
domestic political system. 
 
 
Intervening Variables 
 
In order to analyse the domestic impact of the EU towards the Mediterranean countries the 
research identifies other non-EU actors that may exert some kind of influence in the 
democratization process and thus interfere with the EU impact. 
As Pridham argues the international aspect plays an important role in the democratization 
process even if it changes accordingly to the geopolitical areas. It might even be misleading 
not to consider the international dimension as a relevant aspect when studying the 
democratization of third countries and that the international dimension could be considered 
as a “concomitant factor” compared to the domestic one. 
According to Baracani the presence of an alternative from the EU can be considered an 
essential “context variable” (Baracani, 2008) because it measures the vulnerability of a 
country in relation to the external pressures.  
The intervener actors, thus, exert some kind of pressure to the country that would affect the 
impact of the EU domestically; those actors can not only be international but also regional or 
even domestic legacies with a past historical dimension.  
In this sense Schmitter underlines that the regional context is the most efficient in terms of 
affecting the democratic process because of the cultural and geographical proximity and of the 
tight legacies of the neighbourhood countries, he also argues that the degree of interference of 
a certain international context on a country varies accordingly to the dimension of the nation-
state, the geostrategic position and its economic dependence towards international financial 
flux. 
 
 
The Islamic Variable 
 
When considering the study cases of Morocco and Tunisia the first non EU actor to take 
into consideration is the entity of the relation between secularism and religion. Islam is, in 
fact, a key element to take into consideration because it has always been used as an 
explanatory factor in analysing the failure or the partial breakdown of the democratic process 
in the Maghreb and Middle East.  
Andrea Teti finds that the myth of despotism linked to the Islamic religion in the Western 
discourse descends from the identification of the missed transition in the Ottoman Empire 
and in the successive nation states of an age of “Enlightenment” and thus of the secularization 
of the States, this “lack” interfered with the process of democratization. 
Even in countries such as Morocco, where some political reforms where established, still 
remain some limitation to the political participation because of the interference of various 
forces related to the Ulema, the Islamic scholars of the Islamic law “Sharia”. The main element, 
in the analysis of the importance of the Islamic religion, is the relation between Islam and 
Democracy and the “postulate of their incompatibility” (Teti, 2006), the idea of Sadowski of 
“neo-orientalism” according to which Islam may foster anti democratic processes is still 
present, but the reality of the political life in Muslims states is more complex. 
Islam, per se, can not be used to explain the persistence of certain authoritarian phenomenon, 
what is needed, instead, as Teti argues is to investigate specific political and historical context 
in which those phenomenon appeared, Islam therefore can not be used as the ultimate 
explanatory element of the difficulty of the democratic process in the Maghreb and Middle 
East, instead the Islamists presence in the modern politic of Maghreb became, after the Arab 
Springs, an intervening actor in fostering the democratic process. 
Islam, in fact, experienced three major turning points that demonstrate the ability to change 
and to adapt to the new political challenges. 
The establishment of the movement “Muslim Brotherhood” by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, 
seeking a social and moral freedom for the Islamic world. 
The Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 represents another turning point in the history of 
Islam because it was the first time since the end of the Ottoman Empire that a State was 
governed by the Islamic law. The third turning point is the advent of the Arab Spring, 
according to Khalil al-Anani, this movements meant for the Islamic parties that the historical 
debate whether Islam and Democracy were incompatible became irrelevant. 
 
In the case of Tunisia Islamic forces represent today an important aspect for democracy 
promotion in opposition to the last three decades when Islamic and fundamentalist parties 
were considered threats to the stability of the government. The exemplar case of Tunisia and 
the story of the most important Islamic party “Ennahada” and its incredible come back at the 
elections of October 2011 goes in this way. According to Cavatorta and Merone, Ennahada 
went through a “moderation through inclusion” (Cavatorta and Merone, 2013), it means that 
after decades of exclusion from the government the radical and anti systemic party started to 
re-elaborate its policy rethinking how “political Islam could contribute to the development of 
the country”. 
The case of the transformation of Ennahada can point to a significant trend within political 
Islam in a time when democratization processes are taking place in the Arab World. It 
demonstrates that religious political actors, perceived in the past decades to be adverse to 
liberal rights because of the ideological rigidity, today may bring benefits to democratization. 
In Morocco the traditional Islamic Party of Justice and Development, PJD, won the vast 
majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of October 2011 and inserted itself in that 
remarkable change of the Islamic parties after the Arab Spring. 
 PJD, as well as Ennahada, stays away from religious “absolutism”, adopting a more pragmatic 
position and political discourse. Before the Arab Spring, in fact, terms like democracy or 
elections were profane to Islamists, in Tunisia and Morocco the new progressive Islamists 
parties, thus, are more inclined to respect individual freedoms. 
Ennahada party leaders have recently stressed that they respect women’s right and today, 42 
out of 49 women in the Tunisian Constituent Assembly are members of Ennahada. In this 
sense PJD also showed full respect and commitment to individual rights and freedoms; 
Abdelilah Benkirane, Morocco’s first Islamist prime minister, declared women’s freedom of 
dress and expression, in 2005 PJD encouraged a new family code, the Mudawwana, in order to 
give women more rights. 
Regarding the aspect of Foreign Policy the great change in the Islamic parties is seen in the 
renewed interest in the USA and EU, considered today necessary in fostering the democracies 
of both Tunisia and Morocco. 
 
In conclusion, the Islamic political parties are, de facto, an Intervening factor for what 
concern the democratization of Tunisia and Morocco, both in the historical sense that they 
obstructed the democratic process because it was considered intrinsically opposite of the 
moral values of Islam and also in the post Arab Spring sense, where the Islamic parties in 
Tunisia and Morocco experimented a moderation journey and today are the main supporters 
for the democratization of their countries. 
Islam thus, in the sense of political moderate Islamic parties, is and intervening factor because 
it represents an “alternative” for the democratization process to the external pressure of the 
EU. 
 
 
 
The Context non-EU Variable 
 
Other two actors, with strong legacies with the Maghreb, may be considered to be 
intervening factors in the process of democratization.  
Tunisia and Morocco are part of a relevant geostrategic region called the Maghreb in which 
the West has strong interests that go from keeping the energy supplies accessible, 
liberalization of the economic order to satisfy the needs of international capital, to restrict 
migration and have a support for the peace process between Israel and Palestine, but this 
arrangements used to confine democracy to the background. According to some scholars 
France and the US face a dilemma when they deal with this area, those two countries are, in 
fact, the two most important international non-EU partners (considering France as to act in a 
bilateral way and not as a member of the EU). 
 
Tunisia, in November 1987 saw a “medical coup” (Cavatorta, 2010) conducted by Ben Ali 
that overturned the founding father of the modern and independent Tunisia, Habib Bourgiba, 
after thirty years of power. At the beginning Ben Ali was welcomed as a liberator also because 
of his attempts to start a real political pluralism, the first bid in the whole Maghreb, with the 
formalization of political parties, a free press and the limitation of the Security apparatus. 
Therefore, one year after the coup, all the political parties signed a pact in order to uphold the 
democratic principles and to leave the religion out from the political sphere. The presidential 
elections of 1989, however, are seen as an attempt of Ben Ali to sabotage the democratic 
process, a “project” actually completed only in 1991 with the authoritarian turn. The evidence 
proving that the sabotage of democracy had already started in 1989 is that Ben Ali was 
elected with 99,2% and his party took all the parliamentary seats. In response of this bid 
France and the US welcomed Ben Ali and its anti-Islamic campaign even though the Islamic 
Tunisian party did not advocate a violent overthrow of the regime being, instead, moderate in 
its positions. As Cavatorta underlines, the fear of Islam was just a cover that Ben Ali and both 
France and the US used to allow him to get a strong grip on power and so to set those 
economic reforms that gave advantage to Western enterprises and political elite. 
Tunisia was the first country to experience the protests that came from the civil society 
referred to with the name of “Arab Spring”, the Tunisian personal revolution is called “the 
Jasmine Revolution” and started with protests over the socio-economic conditions and 
corruption that eventually lead to demanding the resignation of president Ben Ali that, in 
2011 had already transformed Tunisia in a non democratic and neo-patrimonial regime. The 
protests sprung from the civil society and in particularly from the young people that 
organized with the social media the manifestations, strangely the protests did not start from 
the Islamic political opposition of Ben Ali. 
 
Morocco, since the independence in 1956, lived in a political absolutism and a constant 
violation of human rights. During the Cold War King Hassan II anchored the country to the 
west camp and in exchange benefited of its benevolence, also thanks to the persecution of the 
left movements led by the government. The ferocity of the Moroccan regime was eventually 
tested in 1990 with the so called “Bread riots”, a series of violent protests of the civil society 
over the cost of bread that forced the government to annul a 30% price hike linked to the soar 
of global grain price. As a result of the violent response to the riots the King was called for 
some political reforms in a democratic sense in order to lead the country to political 
pluralism, but the reform designed by the King was aimed to implement slowly the changes to 
avoid that the left movements and the Islamic party could take advantage from it. 
Only in 1998 the King appointed, after open elections, a socialist as prime minister: 
Abderrahmane Yousoufi.  
King Hassan II died in March 1999 and much trust was put in his son, King Mohamed VI for a 
new pluralist beginning of Morocco. In reality the political liberation was only used to regain a 
strict control on power. 
 
The United States have strong interest in the Maghreb and in particular in recent years the 
main objective of countering the Islamic terrorism was accompanied by the will to tackle its 
main causes: the lack of democracy, socioeconomic conditions, educations and the absence of 
vibrant civil societies in the region (Zoubir, 2008). 
For what concern the relation between Tunisia and the US, since the independence in 1956 
Tunisia was on the list of friend countries of the United States thanks to its pro western 
stance. Tunisia is still today an active member of the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism 
Partnership along with Morocco and other Saharian countries. In order to decrease the US 
criticism on the lack of Human Rights, Tunisian authorities usually consolidated the military 
cooperation and played the Israeli card, by doing so the “regime’s repressive and anti-
democratic measures elicit little criticism from its US ally” (Daguzan, 2011). 
Morocco is also considered to be a traditionally Western ally, always described by the 
American policy makers as an example of an Islamic democracy, American officials designated 
Morocco, under Mohammed VI, a major non-NATO ally (3ème session du dialogue 
strategique). After the Islamist terrorist attacks in Casablanca and Marrakesh in May 2003 
both the international community and Morocco were strongly engaged in the fight against the 
Islamic terrorism and today Morocco is a member of the anti-Daech coalition and is a leader in 
the efforts to preventing young people to join the foreign fighters group (3ème session du 
dialogue strategique). Americans thus appreciate the will of Morocco to fight against the 
Islamic forces while institutionalizing a moderate Islam. 
The relations between Morocco and the US are still today of military support and aid for the 
protection of the borders and to fight the Islamic terrorism. But the Moroccan officials tended 
not to let the US interfere too much in the internal affairs, according to Zoubir the monarchy is 
apprensive about US support for Moroccan NGOs and the relation with the PJD but this 
“moderate” Islamic party, despite the US support, is not willing to normalize its relations with 
Israel. 
As Zoubir finds the United States, during the Algerian crisis, military supported Tunisia and 
Morocco for security reasons. In other words is possible to summarize that the interest of the 
United States in Morocco and Tunisia is to promote the “moderate” Islamist parties that are 
considered not threatening the US interests like the free access to Oil and natural gas and the 
support for Israel, however the problem with the presence of the US in the region and its 
relation with the Islamist forces is the position toward Israel. In fact, even the more moderate 
Islamist parties are critical of the US position toward Hamas, considered as a terrorist 
organization and not as a movement of resistance. According to Zoubir, because of this 
dilemma the US lowered its demand for genuine democratization, preferring to co-opt the 
“moderate” Islamism that do not threat US interests. 
In a PEW survey of May 2011 on the US favorability in the Muslim World is found that the rise 
of pro-democracy movements has not led to an improvements in America’s image in the 
region (PEW Research Center, May 2011), the research also highlighted that the enthusiasm 
for democracy displayed by protestors in Tunisia and Morocco is consistent and democracy is 
viewed as the best form of government and publics in many Muslim countries increasingly 
believe that a democratic government rather than a strong leader is the best way to solve 
problems. With such a state of facts it is hard to see how the US can have a positive influence 
in the region if they continue to prefer stability over real democracy. 
 
 
For what concern the relation of France with the ex colonies of the Maghreb there are few 
structural factors to take into consideration: the presence in France of a large Maghrebi 
minority that has affected French policies towards the region, the Human Rights factor is also 
pivotal because in order to maintain a “special relation” and because of its actions during the 
colonial past France is very reluctant to address the question of human rights in both Tunisia 
and Morocco. In the case of Tunisia, in fact, the French Foreign Minister did not disapproved 
the Bourguiba’s repression or the Ben Ali’s prison system (Daguzan, 2008). In Morocco, in the 
same way, nothing has been said about the regime illicit arrests and violence over the political 
oppositions. The only attempt was the one of Mitterand who raised the case of the opposition 
trade union leader, Abraham Serfaty, and the Cadets involved in the coup against the King, 
Hassain II, in 1971 (Daguzan, 2008). It follows that the Maghrebi policy of France is linked to 
the historical path and the importance of the Francophonie policy and there is an evident 
tolerance of the Human Rights abuses. 
Considering the relations of Tunisia and Morocco with France we have to underline the fact 
that the Mediterranean has always been a French affair and France considered the Maghreb 
States a “private playing field” (Daguzan, 2011).  
In the case of Tunisia, during Ben Ali presidency, France renewed the connection with the 
former colony in particular in the economic stance with an agreement on the elimination of 
trade barriers for manufactures, the political dimension of this agreement regarded the 
promise Tunisia made to speed up the political liberalization, but the relation between Ben Ali 
and France were not that good as the former Tunisian president was considered to be an US 
ally thanks to Ben Ali support for Israel and the peace process. 
After the resignation of Ben Ali in 2011 and, as a whole, in the aftermath of the Jasmine 
Revolution, France acted with prudence toward Tunisia. Only in 2012, in fact, the foreign 
minister Alain Juppé visited the country, proposing to the new elected representatives of 
Ennhada a “partnership of equals to equals” (Juppè, LePoint, 2012), and he proposed to 
condition the aid of France toward Tunisia to the respect of democracy and of the Rule of Law. 
 
The political liberations of the 90s allowed the crown of Morocco to regain a firm hold on 
power and with France with a strong assistance, but the French hopes for a true 
democratization, in particular after Hassan’s death and the succession of Mohammed VI, have 
been sacrificed in the name of stability. After the failure of the already cited socialist Prime 
Minister, Yousoufi, to pull Morocco out of economic stagnation now the Islamists represent 
the main political forces and in particular the PJD party. 
The relation between Morocco and France continue both on the economic and diplomatic side 
even though the relations were particularly good during the presidency of Pompidou and 
D’Estaing also thanks to the Pompidou’s foreign minister, Michel Jobert, who was born in 
Morocco. During the Mitterand’s era the relations were ruined because of the agitations of the 
French organizations for the defence of human rights in consequence of several severe 
episodes of violations from the Moroccan monarch, i.e the discovery of the secret Tazmamart 
prison holding political opponents. With the election of Chirac the relation changed because 
the president had close relationship with King Hassan II, after his death the personal relations 
with son, Mohammed VI, were not as tight and the ties slowly strained. Despite the fact that 
the French maneuvers with Morocco were diminished still few bilateral treaties were signed 
for security and defence cooperation as well as trade, language promotion (Francophonie) and 
culture. A thorny point for Morocco is the Western Sahara dispute, the crisis began under the 
D’Estaing presidency and in that occasion France was a fervent military and diplomatic ally of 
both Morocco and Mauritania, today the official position of France toward that dispute is 
neutral and the solution must be found within the UN framework, only Spain recognized the 
“illegal” occupation of Morocco in the Western Sahara. 
 
 
 
EU and Democracy Promotion 
 
Albeit the history of an European democracy promotion action is rather recent compared 
to the whole European integration process, there are some evidence in the literature to assess 
that this is a consolidated practice nowadays. Indeed, in the original founding treaties of the 
EU there was no mention of “democracy” and it was only in 1962, when the European 
Parliament approved the Birkelbach report, that, for the first time, the necessary political 
conditions were established for membership and also association status of the European 
Community. The 70s and the 80s were characterized by the Declaration on Democracy at the 
Copenaghen Summit and, most notably, by the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, three 
ex authoritarian regimes at the heart of Europe. It was in this important enlargement that, to 
the EC membership, was attached the condition of democracy; as underlined by Kubicek in his 
work “The European Union and Democratization” the scholar considered that particular 
accession the first real example of EC democracy promotion, but according to Baracani the 
way in which this enlargement was held proves that the EU became a democracy promotion 
actor more by accident then by “design” (Baracani, 2010).  Since the 1991 Development 
Council resolution, that first committed the EU to place the promotion of democracy and 
human rights more systematically at the heart of its foreign policy, the EU has made great 
efforts in order to “equip itself for implementing this declared objective” (Gillespie and 
Youngs, 2002).  
A structural and formal discourse around democracy, therefore, appeared with the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and, with the creation of the EU, democracy and its 
consolidation became one of the core objective of CFSP. After that, in 1993, the Copenaghen 
Criteria formally established the condition of democracy for the Central and Eastern Europe. 
In the post-Maastricht integration acceleration the EU established a number of new 
instruments namely Common Positions, Common Strategies, the High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the use of Special Envoys and all those instruments 
helped to increase the EU’s unity on the international stage with the perceived need for a 
more effective support for democratic norms.  
The Lisbon Treaty did not add much to the governance aspect of democracy promotion, albeit 
an innovative normative supplement was added in Art. 49 of the TEU where two democratic 
values, human dignity and equality, were inserted in the Treaty underlining that any 
European state wishing to apply to become a member of the EU should not only respect those 
values but also be committed to promote them (Baracani, 2010). 
Notwithstanding these developments many criticisms were held to the EU’s limited 
capacities as a coherent international actor, as Gillespie and Youngs underline the 
institutional changes introduced by the Treaty on the European Union in 1993, foreign policy 
coordination had not become notably more effective, in particular it was the absence of any 
significant common European security and defence competence that widely held to 
undermine the EU’s general diplomatic weight (Gillespie and Youngs, 2002).  
On the other side, though, a Sui Generis foreign policy was actually being established with 
the perspective of the Eastern Enlargement, in fact, the EU Governance had to establish 
different tools in order to enable the ex Soviet countries to make highly costly reforms for the 
accession. The Enlargement policy is an important means to take into account in order to 
understand the ENP; Enlargement, as Karen Smith argues, has had and will have a very large 
impact on the EU because it increases the EU’s global weight but also because it was also with 
this policy that the EC put off the prospect of adopting a “concentric circles” approach (Smith, 
2011).  
 
An interesting contribution in the study of the EU democracy promotion is the one 
provided by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig in their work “EU external governance”, they 
underline how the democratization of the EU is characterized by the governance approach 
and it concentrates on changes in rules and practices within each policy sectors concerned 
and those changes happen as a consequence of the exposure to the EU Acquis, thus the 
vehicles of policy transfer are transgovernmental networks rather than intergovernmental 
negotiations (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). According to the two scholars in defining 
the EU external Governance as the extension of internal rules and policies beyond formal 
membership in the attempt to transfer EU’s rule to third countries, i.e. Enlargement Policy, the 
EU showed the magnetic force of the EU’s Integration and of EU’s Transformative Power. 
As a result of the last enlargement the EU has become, at all purposes, a democracy 
promoter developing a series of instruments that allowed a direct action with the 
implementation of the political conditionality; but the new challenges, after the enlargement, 
where those connected to the dilemma about how to deal with the ”Wider Europe” at the 
borders In the aftermath of the Eastern enlargement, therefore, the EU established the 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in order to replicate the successful strategy of democracy 
promotion with the newly countries at the borders. After the Enlargement, thus, the EU 
clearly became a democracy promotion international actor facing new challenges, namely 
those countries without membership perspective of the Union.  
 
According to Pavehouse, in fact, the added value of the EU vis-à-vis other international 
organizations that promote democracy is its “democratic density”, in other words the level of 
democracy between its members. Dimitrova and Pridham underline that the EU, compared to 
the Council of Europe or NATO, is “a system of governance that covers an increasingly large 
number of policy areas and affects all aspects of the governance of its member states”, they 
also assert that the success of the EU in democratizing the post-communist states showed 
how an “integration pattern” has emerged as an example of a successful and unique 
democracy promotion model.   
We can consider the ENP as the ultimate level of democracy promotion legal framework in 
the integration process of the EU. In fact, in the late 1990s, the EU moved beyond the formal 
democratic criteria initially formulated of liberal democratic constitutions, provision of 
accountability, free elections and prevalence of pro-democracy parties (Dimitrova and 
Pridham, 2004), establishing new political criteria included, for example, the dependence of 
the judiciary. It is with the treaty of Amsterdam that the EU, eventually, recognise democracy 
as one of the common values of its member states, with the Treaty of Nice a further step was 
made with reference on Democracy, Rule of Law and the Respect of Human Rights and again 
with the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in 2004, that reiterates that the 
Union is founded on the values of respect of Human Dignity, Freedom, Democracy, Equality, 
Rule of Law and respect of Human Rights (Art.2) and in Title V it is asserted that “The Union 
action on the international scene shall be guided by the principle which have inspired its own 
creation [..] and which it seeks to advance in the wider world” (Art 193, title V, Chapter I on 
Provisions having general application).  
Apart from the Treaties, in 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security 
Strategy that provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP, in this text democracy 
promotion is not merely considered the principal objective of EU external action but the mean 
by which the EU could pursuit its final objectives, namely security, political stability and 
prosperity of its member states (Baracani, 2010) so the EU becomes a democracy promotion 
actor in order to promote security, stability and prosperity at its borders. 
 
This paper builds on the theoretical approach provided by Levitsky and Way and their 
variables used to explain democratization in the international environment. 
In order to describe the domestic impact of the EU in promoting democratic reforms, indeed, 
a first useful approach is to investigate the ties between those two countries and the EU, i.e 
institutional, economic, trade and social linkages in the legal frame of the ENP. This might 
seems odd because represents a wider frame of investigation compared to the democracy 
promotion but, as Baracani states, it is not enough to consider only those specific activities 
aiming at democracy promotion, “it is necessary to examine what the EU offers the target 
countries in exchange for the respect for its democratic conditions” (Baracani, 2010).  
 
 
The Independent Variables 
 
According to the authors, Levitsky and Way, the international dimension, in the post cold 
war period, operates along two dimension; those are the western leverage or the degree of 
vulnerability of a country vis-à-vis the external democratic pressure and the linkages to the 
west, namely the density of ties: economic, political, diplomatic, social, organizational and 
cross border flows.  
What is pivotal in this description is that, according to the authors, “leverage in the absence of 
linkages has rarely been sufficient to induce democratization, since the end of the cold war” 
(Levitsky and Way, 2006). While linkage is crucial to the exercise of leverage, this relationship 
is only important if leverage is actually able to make authoritarian regimes realize that the 
political cost to authoritarianism is too high. Leverage alone is, according to Levitsky and Way, 
barely sufficient to convince authoritarian regimes to democratize and is “most effective when 
combined with extensive linkage to the West” (Levitsky and Way, 2006). Linkages, in fact, are 
so important for democratization because their raise the cost of autocratic abuses by 
increasing the international salience of the country and the likelihood of an international 
response and, most important, because they boost the number of domestic actors that have 
interests in adhering to the international norms, or in this case, to the values and norms 
promoted by the EU. The analysis of Levitsky and Way continues describing that different 
combinations of leverage and linkages create distinct external environments, in fact whereas 
leverage and linkages are high, the international factors may play a decisive role, while where 
leverage and linkages are low domestic factors are more likely to predominate in exerting 
democratic pressures. Even if is clear that both leverage and linkages rise the cost for the 
authoritarian regimes this two variables do so in different manners.  
 
The definition provided by Levitsky and Way of Linkages is “the density of ties and cross-
border flows between a particular country and the US, the EU and western dominated 
multilateral institutions” (Levitsky and Way, 2006). Linkages are an important variable to 
take into consideration because they boost the international salience towards autocratic 
abuses and with strong linkages the likelihood to trigger a response from the EU as a 
consequence of the abuses is higher. The economic linkages, in particular, strengthen the 
number of firms that are interested in maintain a high flow of investment with the EU, 
whereas cultural linkages increase the number of western-educated elite and for them the 
association with an authoritarian regime implies increased costs. Linkages, therefore, trigger 
the Socialization method of influence (Morlino and Magen, 2008) enabling the domestic actor 
to perceive the EU norm as appropriate and legitimate. For those reasons linkages enhance 
the effectiveness of leverage.  
 
According to the authors different combination of linkages and leverage create different 
configuration of the external environment and, thus, the relative influence of domestic and 
international forces may vary considerably. For the purpose of this research is useful to 
summarize the finding of the study as follow:  
 
- Whereas linkages are high and leverage is high the external democratizing pressure is 
consistent and effective 
- Whereas linkages are low and leverage is high the external pressure is intermitted and 
limited 
- Whereas linkages are high and leverage is low the external democratizing pressure is 
consistent but diffuse 
- Whereas linkages are low and leverage is low the external democratizing pressure is 
expected to be weak. 
 
According to this four ideal-typical configuration provided by Levitsky and Way it will be 
possible to infer whether the EU pressure is higher in the descriptive analysis that follows.  
 
In order to measure the EU Leverage, i.e. the vulnerability of Tunisia toward the EU, we will 
rely on the economic weakness, the state dimension and the presence of other democratizing 
actors, namely the intervening variables. This is due to the fact that, as already underlined in 
the first part, in the ENP the European positive Conditionality is considered as a very weak 
instrument because of the absence of a credible membership perspective, therefore it is not 
possible to rely only on the evaluation of the conditions imposed by the EU in order to 
measure the vulnerability of the target countries. Tunisian linkages to the EU are, for the 
purpose of this paper, the economic ties negotiated between Brussels and Tunis in the time 
frame of the ENP. 
 
 
EU Linkages and Leverage to Tunisia 
 
The first commercial agreement between Tunisia and the European Economic Community 
dates back to 1969, followed by a cooperation agreement in 1976. Tunisia was the first 
country of South Mediterranean to sign the Association Agreement in 1995 and the Action 
Plan, in the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, was established in 2005. 
For what concern Agricultural and Rural policy area the Commission states that the EU 
seeks to develop closer relation with Tunisia but not particular bilateral Agreements have 
been established. For what concern Trade policy area Tunisia is part of the DCFTA, an 
agreement aiming at improving market access opportunity and the investments, a 
Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of the DCFTA has been carried out by an independent 
contractor (European Commission: 2, 2014). For what concern Economic and Financial policy 
area even if the last macroeconomic dialogue was held on February 2014 what differs Tunisia 
from Morocco is that on May 2014 the Parliament and the Council approved the Macro 
Financial Assistance loans to help Tunisia overcome the severe economic difficulties caused 
by the political transition and the Commission approved the disbursement of the first tranche 
of the MFA on 14 April 2015 attaching the condition of reforms to improve the public finance 
management, to enhance tax equity but also increase tax collection while strengthen banking 
regulation. (European Commission: 3, 2014) 
 
For what concern the International Affair policy area the negotiation with Tunisia are still 
on going, on 7 June 2013 a Mobility partnership was concluded and on March 2014 the EU 
and Tunisia established their Mobility Partnership in order to promote a common and 
responsible management of existing migratory flows. The EU and Tunisia are thus committed 
to encourage better integration of Tunisian nationals legally living in the EU (European 
Commission: 2, 2014). 
Tunisia is highly linked to the EU under the Research and Innovation policy area, in the last 
years many conferences were held in Tunis, especially the last International Conference on 
Sustainable Water Management that was defined as being “a great success” by the 
Commission in providing a forum for researchers to exchange on recent developments. FP7 
supported EU-Tunisia BILAT project and FETRIC that will strengthen the cooperation in the 
context of Horizon 2020 (Web Source: Commission: 3). Tunisia is part of the EU project 
Tempus with 40 projects activated in 2014 and young professionals and students can take 
part of the Erasmus+ project (European Commission: 3, 2015). 
 
According to the Commission, EU is the first Tunisian Trade partner and in 2014 the total 
trade amounts were approximately 2.1 billion € (Web Source: Commission: 4); the main EU 
imports from Tunisia are transport equipment, textile, clothing, fuels and mining products 
while the EU’s exports to Tunisia are mostly transport equipment, fuels and mining products 
and chemicals. (European Commission: 2, 2015) 
 
 
Tunisia linkages Agricultural and Rural policy 
 Trade policy 
 Mobility Partnership and International Affairs 
policy 
 Educational and cultural policy 
 Association Agreement and Action Plan 
 DCFTA launch October 2015 
Figure 1 – The main linkages of Tunisia to the EU in different Policy areas 
 
 
The analysis of the linkages is framed in the broad theoretical approach of Levistky and 
Way and in their assumptions about the relation between Linkages and Leverage, this 
approach is thus an useful causal mechanism that enables to propose some consideration at 
this point of the research. 
In order to provide the first hypothesis is, therefore, necessary to focus on the aspect of 
linkages and the EU leverage. As already underlined the positive conditionality aspect of 
leverage is inconsistent for what concern the countries that are part of the Neighbourhood 
Policy because it is clearly stated by the Commission that the EU will offer “anything but 
institutions”.  
For this reason, according to the purpose of this research paper I will rely on the aspect of 
the size of the country, the economic strength and the presence of other regional actor 
promoting democracy in order to evaluate the Leverage of the EU, i.e. the vulnerability of 
Tunisia vis-à-vis the European Union. 
 
Tunisia leverage to the EU € 2,1 billion of total trade amount with the EU in 
2014 
 Micro financial Assistance from the EU 
 Population of 11 million people 
 Total area of 163,610 km2 
Source – Freedomhouse.org, Trade.eu  
 
 
 
 
EU Linkages and leverage to Morocco 
Morocco was included in the European construction process in 1957 being named as a 
privileged partner in the annex of the Treaty of Rome. 
The formal relations with the European Community start in July 1969 when a cooperation 
commercial agreement was signed. In 1987 King Hassan asked for the European Community 
membership in name of a continuous orientation of its foreign policy toward Europe but, by 
contrast, the European Council turned down this request considering Morocco not an 
European country. After that the EU-Moroccan relations were upgraded thanks to the Euro-
Maghreb Partnership an approach set-up by the Commission in 1992 designed not only to 
make use of existing instruments but to create new ones with economic, political and social 
impact (European Commission: 1, 2015). Year 1995 is the turning point in the institutional 
linkages because with the Barcelona Declaration the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
was established. 
The legal framework of their relation is the Association Agreement, signed in 1996 and 
entered into force on 1 March 2000, demonstrating the status of one of the most advanced 
countries in the region in pursuing a process of democratisation and consolidation of the Rule 
of Law (European Commission: 1, 2015). As a consequence ten working parties have been set 
up under the AA including a new subcommittee on “human Rights, democratisation and 
governance”. 
 
For what concern Agricultural and Rural policy area the Commission seeks to develop close 
relation with Morocco but not specifically Agreements have been established so far. 
For what concern Trade policy area Morocco is linked with the EU under the Trade agreement 
DCFTA launched in march 2013 in order to bring Moroccan legislation closer to the EU 
legislation (Europan Commission: 2, 2013). In addition, EU-Moroccan Agreement on 
Agricultural and Fisheries products entered into force on 1 October 2012 and they also 
negotiated an agreement on mutual protection of Geographic indications (Web Source: 
eeas.europa.eu/enp). 
For what concern Economic and Financial policy area, Morocco is tied with the EU with the 
latest economic dialogue held in November 2014. With the programme “Succeed the 
Advanced Status” of 180 million €, the EU supports the development of a National 
Convergence Plan that will help Morocco to take advantage from the potential offered by a 
possible accession to the EU internal market. Since the entry into force of the treaty of Lisbon 
the European Parliament has an enhanced role to play in the EU-Morocco partnership thanks 
to the EU-Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee. 
For what concern the Energy policy area the Commission has signed a 43 million € financing 
agreement for one on the world’s largest solar energy projects in Morocco. The project aim, 
according to the Commission, is to shore-up the country’s energy security, diversify its energy 
sources, cut carbon emission and create jobs.  The Commissioner and the Minister of Energy 
of Morocco met in May 2015 and unveiled three new Euro-Mediterranean Platforms to 
incentivise dialogue, facilitate partnerships between stakeholders and strengthen cooperation 
(Web Source: Commission: 1). 
For what concern International Affairs policy area on 7 June 2013 EU and Morocco 
established a Mobility Partnership with the aim, in particular, to strengthen the Migration 
cooperation. Morocco is especially linked to EU under the Research and Innovation policy 
area which involves the country in the multi-lateral dialogue platform MedSpring, 
ERANETMED and had a good trend of participation in FP7, the European Union research and 
innovation funding programme before Horizon 2020, where the EU contribution amounts at 
296 million €. Morocco is also training in order to know and master the tools and founding 
opportunities of Horizon 2020 (Web Source: Commission: 2). Morocco is engaged in the EU 
programme Tempus with 40 projects activated in 2014 and Erasmus+ for young professional 
and students (Web Source: Commission: 2). 
 
According to the Commission EU is Morocco's first trading partner with total trade 
amounting to approximately 29.25 billion € in 2014. EU imports from Morocco are dominated 
by three main areas: machinery and transport equipment, textiles and clothing and 
agricultural products, EU exports to Morocco are dominated by machinery and transport 
equipment, fuels and metals (Web Source: Commission: 1, 2014). 
Morocco leverage to the EU € 29,25 billion of total trade amount with the EU 
in 2014 
 Important US trading export 
 Population of 33 million people 
 Total area of 446,550 km2 
Source – Freedomhouse.org, Trade.eu 
 
As Baracani underlined, the vulnerability of a country can be measured taking into 
consideration the economic weight and the possibility to rely on an alternative to the EU 
regional power (Baracani, 2008) and Levitsky and Way stated that whereas the linkages are 
diffused and when the country is vulnerable to the leverage the external pressure for 
democratic reforms, in this case the EU, plays a pivotal role (Levitsky and Way, 2006). 
 
In conclusion we can state that Tunisia is more vulnerable to the EU pressure than Morocco 
but both countries present dense ties with the EU and therefore the EU as a democratization 
actor might exert some impact in both countries but in a comparison perspective Tunisia is 
more subjected to the European external pressure for democratization because of its greater 
vulnerability. 
 
 
 Analysis of the Main Developments: the dependent variables 
 
This part deals with the analysis of the dependent variables, namely all the reforms 
realized by Tunisia and Morocco in order to respect the values and requests of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
This part of the research is, therefore, of particular importance because in this section the 
main focus will be to underline the causal relation between the EU pressure and the norm 
adoption. 
 
According to Morlino and Magen (Morlino and Magen, 2008) the democratic impact 
happens on more than one level, precisely there are three different level of change: norm 
adoption, implementation and internalization. What the authors wanted to underline is that, 
when dealing with the control of the impact, it is not sufficient to rely only on the 
transposition of a certain norm in the legislation of the target government but it is also the 
total renovation of the domestic institutions to take into consideration or the creation of new 
institutions following the external model (i.e. the EU) together with the differentiation of the 
internal practices. This introduction is needed in order to assert that in this research I will 
rely only on the first level of change, as underlined by Morlino and Magen, I will, therefore, 
only focus on the causal relation between the EU requests and the reforms adopted. 
 
For the purpose of this research, given the importance attached to the EU documents as a 
pivotal source for controlling the EU impact, this last part will focus only on two categories of 
democracy following the partition provided by the EU based on the Copenaghen Criteria: 
Democracy and Rule of Law, Human Rights and protection of minorities. Notably I will focus 
on the main developments, in particular on those mentioned categories, that the two 
countries made from 2011 to 2015. 
In particular, what allows to assert that there is a causal nexus between the reforms and the 
EU actions is the constant monitoring of the Commission. For this reason the democratic 
partition chosen is the one provided by the EU. 
 
 
 
Tunisia 
 
Since the beginning of the Jasmine Revolution the EU Commission recognised that Tunisia 
took some important initiatives that contributed to the democratic transition in particular on 
political reforms, corruption and the abuses perpetuated during the revolution. From an 
European point of view Tunisia has entered into far-reaching undertakings on Democracy, 
Good Governance and Human Rights. These undertakings must now be followed up by 
tangible progress in the future years, as underlined the last Progress Report on Tunisia 
(European Commission: 3, 2015). 
Tunisia has, notably, accepted the establishment of a sub-committee for human rights in the 
framework of the Association Agreement. The New Constitution adopted in 2014 is 
considered to provide guarantees on Democracy and Freedom of Association, but in practice a 
number of factors continue to restrict the development of political pluralism, for instance the 
way in which political parties are set up as well as the electoral system, which favours the 
ruling party. 
Since 2011 the Commission engaged in providing technical and financial aids in order to 
support the organization of free and fair elections. Nowadays Tunisia is reported by the 
Commission to have undertaken a dynamic road of democratization characterised by the 
adoption of the new Electoral Law and the positive results, in terms of organization and 
fairness, of the last political elections.  
 
Most notably Tunisia requested the opinion of the Venice Commission on the New 
Constitution adopted in 2014. The Venice Commission is the advisory body of the Council of 
Europe that assists requesting countries all over the world on constitutional matter in order 
to improve the functioning of the democratic institution and therefore the respect of Human 
Rights. The advisory request sent by Tunisia to a body of the EU clearly represents an 
important aspect for the purpose of the evaluation of the impact of the EU democracy 
promotion action. In fact the perception of the EU being an assistant in the consolidation of 
democracy is clearly inserted in the methodological approach that inspires this research.  
 
 
 
 
THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 
 
In the Progress Report issued in 2012 by the Commission the EU asked as a priority, in the 
aftermath of the revolution, the adoption of a new electoral law and the enforcement of the 
“Instance Publique indépendante” for the organization of the elections (European 
Commission: 1, 2012). Following the invitation of the Tunisian authorities the EU sent a 
mission for the monitoring of the election of 2011 for the new Constituent Assembly. 
According to the expert the new juridical framework was compliant with the international 
norms in the matter of democratic elections. After the elections Tunisia respected the EU 
requests with the enforcement of the “Instance Publique indépendante” (ISIE) and also with 
the creation of the Independent Electoral Commission but still the new electoral law had to be 
approved. 
A successful national dialogue involving most of the political class culminated in January 2014 
with the passage of the Constitution, the establishment of a new election commission, and the 
formation of a politically neutral caretaker government under Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa 
(Web Source: Freedom House/Tunisia, 2015). In March, President Moncef Marzouki lifted the 
state of emergency imposed during the 2011 revolution when the government was pursuing a 
reinvigorated crackdown on terrorist groups and in May the passage of a new electoral law 
set the stage for legislative elections in October and a two-round presidential election in 
November and December. 
 
It is important to focus on the successful relation between the EU and the new Tunisian 
Constitution and electoral law. 
A story of success, in fact, is the one about the request sent by the President of the NCA 
National Constituent Assembly Mr Mustafa Ben Jaafer to the Council of Europe in order to 
receive advises for the Constitution drafting process, according to the experts of the Venice 
Commission “the rapporteurs of the Commission are impressed with the quality of the work 
of the NCA. They express hope that the several suggestions formulated in the document 
released today will be of help to the NCA” (Venice Commission, 2013). The New Tunisian 
Commission resulted to be modern, characterized by universal values such as Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and notably new rights like those linked to the environment. The 
Constitution guarantee equality between women and men and the elaboration process had an 
inclusive character.  
For what concern the new electoral code the EU underlined in the last three years the need for 
a new electoral law based on certain important pillars that could conduct to free, inclusive 
and fair election, for example the establishment already cited of ISIE. Finally, in December 
2013 the new electoral code was approved and the EU electoral Observation Mission (MOE) 
engaged in Tunisia during 2014 had the chance to evaluate the goodness of the new electoral 
code and prescription on the compulsory registration of the voters before the election. In fact, 
according to the EU and other international observers, the 2014 legislative and presidential 
elections were held in a peaceful and tidy environment. According to the EU expert the new 
juridical framework provided positive democratic elections that met the International 
Standard, albeit some inconsistencies were underlined by the MOE: the too restrictive  
electoral campaign and the regime of sanctions connected to the violation of the norms of the 
electoral financing (Web Source: EEAS, 2014).  
 
 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
The EU reported in 2012 that Freedom of Association was strengthen with the adoption of 
a new law in September 2011 that facilitates the possibility of the establishment of new 
association, only with a simple declaration, this law also gives the possibility for the 
International Organization to open the “bureau” in the Tunisian territory (European 
Commission: 1, 2012). Notably in 2013 the Commission reported that, after the establishment 
of the law already mentioned, more than 4000 new associations were created giving the 
chance to the Civil Society to actively participate to public debates on democratic transition of 
Tunisia (European Commission: 3, 2013).  
After this evaluation of good progress the Commission almost stopped to underline the 
Freedom of Expression issue from the Progress Report on Tunisia and only in 2015, in the 
aftermath of the approval of the New Constitution, the EU requested the implementation of 
the rights expressed in the Constitution. 
The Commission requested a real reform of the legal instruments and procedures because of 
still limit respect of fundamental freedoms like Freedom of Expression. The EU request is 
therefore very mild and today Tunisia still faces a not real enforcement of those rights written 
in the Constitution.  
According to Freedom House in fact, the new constitution guarantees freedoms of opinion, 
thought, expression, information, and publication but the media continued to face specific 
obstacles in 2014. Fewer journalists were arrested or convicted on defamation and other 
charges than in 2013, but the government did use the legal system to punish independent 
reporting on security grounds, targeting journalists with Islamist leanings in particular. 
Criminal cases were brought against the internet users for the contents they posted online.  
Notably, the blogger Yassine Ayari was tried for “defaming the army” on Facebook after he 
criticized Defense Minister Ghazi Jeribi and other military leaders (Web Source: Freedom 
house/Tunisia, 2015).  
 
 
MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
 
For what concerns media, the Tunisian media environment remained in transition in 2012 
following the overthrow of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in early 2011. 
As a consequence, the space for media freedom opened considerably under the transitional 
government, which released jailed journalists, bloggers, and activists and passed a number of 
measures to promote press freedom during its first year in office. In 2012, however, both 
government and opposition forces exerted increased the pressure on news content, and 
journalists faced an uptick in violence (Web Source: Freedomhouse/Tunisia, 2013).  
In fact, as underlined by the Commission, if on one side in 2012 Tunisia saw the creation of 
the “High independent authority for the audiovisual communication” (HAICA), as requested 
by the EU in the previous years, on the other side no big improvements were undertaken. In 
fact the Press Code, adopted in 2011, was still not implemented and the HAICA still not 
adopted. After another request sent by the Commission in the Progress Report of 2013, 
monitoring progress of year 2012, Tunisia finally achieved some improvements in 2013 with 
the adoption of the HAICA (European Commission: 3, 2013).  
The Tunisian Constitution guarantees the freedom of the press and freedom of 
Publication; however, the Press Code strictly regulates the exercise of these freedoms 
through rules governing publication and printing, the setting-up of periodicals, 
concentration of ownership, circulation of foreign periodicals, subversion and libel.  
A step forward was taken when the obligation for a number of copies to be deposited with the 
authorities prior to publication was abolished. Wide-ranging censorship of the national and 
international media, newspapers and foreign publications continues under this restrictive 
legislation. Foreign newspapers and journals and especially their distribution in Tunisia may 
result in governmental interventions which equal censorship. Nevertheless, the EU 
Commission barely focused on the issue of the Independence of the press and Freedom of 
expression even if it is considered an important step to overcome in the process of 
democratization, according to Freedom House, in fact, defamation cases continued to be filed 
against members of the press during the year. In February, journalist Ghazi Mabrouk was 
charged with “defamation and publishing false news” for an article that revealed poor 
working conditions in a clothing factory. He faced up to two years in prison if convicted. Also 
that month, the director of two daily newspapers, Abdel Aziz al-Jaridi, was sentenced to four 
months in jail following his June 2011 conviction for defaming a news anchor with Qatar’s Al-
Jazeera television network (Web Source: Freedom house/Tunisia, 2015). 
The Commission started to underline the necessity for the respect of freedom of expression 
only in the Progress Report issued in 2014 monitoring year 2013. In this document the 
experts asked the application of the administrative order n. 115 and 116 of the press code, 
while in 2015 the Commission remained even more vague only requesting the consolidation 
of the respect of constitutional rights, among which freedom of expression. 
 
JUSTICE 
 
The EU engaged more in requesting some changes in order to provide an effective 
independence of the Judiciary. Albeit the foundations of an independent Judiciary are laid 
down in the new Constitution, however, the Supreme Judicial Council and the Public 
Prosecutor's Office remain heavily under the influence of the Executive. Starting from 2012 
the Commission underlined the need to adopt the legislative reforms in order to assure the 
independence of the Judiciary, in 2013 no results were monitored and, instead, it was 
underlined how still the magistrates were nominated by the executive power (European 
Commission: 3, 2013).  
According to the EU Commission the principle of irremovably has never been established and 
judges may be transferred at any moment. The Lawyers' Association nevertheless manages to 
maintain a degree of independence from the Executive even if it cannot always guarantee the 
rights of defence. However, a number of observers have reported irregularities affecting the 
independence of the association of magistrates.  In 2014 the Commission was still reporting 
about the need to adopt the constitutional reforms in order to enforce the Rule of Law and the 
independence of justice, the access to justice and the right of a fair trial. 
In the new Constitution, 22 articles establish and guarantee a robust and independent 
judiciary, and the caretaker government of 2014 was seen as more impartial and constructive 
in its administration of the Justice Ministry, oversight of the police, and interactions with the 
judiciary than its predecessors (Web Source: Freedom house/Tunisia, 2015). However, the 
degree of judicial strength and independence will depend on legal and political actions taken 
by the new elected government and its successors. Judicial reform stalled in the run-up to the 
2014 elections, with both the organic laws governing reform and the personnel who would 
implement them to be determined by the new legislature. In one survey, 56% of Tunisians 
said that they thought the judiciary was corrupt. 
It seems, therefore, that the great efforts put by both the EU and Tunisia in the organization of 
the new elections and the new Constitution obstructed the reforms in the area of the Rule of 
Law and especially regarding the judiciary. 
 
TORTURE 
 
The EU put great effort in requesting the adoption of the International Conventions on 
Human Rights and the adhesion to the instruments of the Council of Europe. In fact, in 2011 
Tunisia adhered to the Rome Statute and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. Still 
in 2011 the special delegate of the UN against torture denounced the persistence of abuses 
committed by agents of security after the downfall of the Ben Ali regime. Therefore the Special 
delegate of the UN requested the establishment of some reforms in this matter and so in July 
2011 the Bureau du Haut Commisaire aux Droits de l’Homme de Nations Unis was created in 
Tunis. In 2013 the Commission requested the effective implementation of the International 
Conventions on Human Rights but for what concerns Torture some improvements were 
actually realised, in fact after the ratification of the Protocol the EU found that the Tunisian 
authorities were establishing the national mechanism for the prevention of torture. In 2014 
the Progress Report issued by the Commission recommended that Tunisia would effectively 
implement the mechanism for the prevention of Torture and specifically the motion of Law: 
2013-43 (European Commission: 4, 2014). This is what the EU requested again in 2015, in 
particular underlining the need for a better implementation of those mechanisms (European 
Commission: 3, 2015). Even if Tunisia is the first country of the Maghreb to have established 
those mechanism of prevention of torture this is still not operational and many cases of 
degrading actions are currently reported. The EU acted, in this matter, as a supporter of the 
International Convention relying, in this way, on the International Laws to which the EU is 
firmly committed. 
 
 EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN  
 
Tunisia has long been praised for relatively progressive social policies, especially in the 
areas of family law and women’s rights. The 2014 constitution guarantees equality before the 
law for men and women, and the 1956 personal status code giving women same equality with 
men has remained in force. It grants women equal rights in divorce and children born to 
Tunisian mothers and foreign fathers are automatically granted citizenship. In 2013 the 
Commission recognised that the issue on gender equality was deeply discussed in the 
Constitutional Assembly during 2012, in fact the Tunisian organisation for the equality 
between women and men feared a degradation of the woman condition in the aftermath of 
the new Constitution and they denounced the continuous events of violence against women 
both in the public sphere and in the domestic environment (European Commission: 3, 2013).  
The EU experts of the Commission underlined that in 2012 Tunisia did not left all the reserves 
on the Convention on the elimination of all form of discrimination against women (CEDEF). 
The year after the EU was still requesting improvement in the enforcement of women rights, 
again on the deposit of the notification of the reserves lifting on the Convention CEDEF 
(European Commission: 3, 2013).  
Violence against women were still reported by the EU together with some promising 
improvements like the legislative decree that establishes regional delegations of the Ministry 
of Women Affaires in the 24 regional governments. The EU is, however, only engaged in 
asking the Tunisian conciliation with the International Standards in this matter.  
 
Morocco 
 
THE CONSTITUTION REVISION 
For what concern the Constitution Revision, according to the expert a key element of 2011 
was that the New Constitution was adopted with a great majority (98.5%). After the 
referendum on the new Constitution the parliamentary elections took place (European 
Commission: 2, 2012). A committee of experts from the EU helped with the electoral 
observation underlining the need for a longer political campaign, the announcement of the 
results after the vote and a stronger participation of women. The new government started its 
works in January 2012 according to the provisions of the new Constitution.  
In 2012 the experts of the Commission underlined that, despite the reports of several mission 
of electoral observation, the National Council of Human Rights (CNDH) issued some 
recommendation for amends of the law on electoral observation but this was not listed as a 
priority for 2012 by the government. Nowadays, for what concern the adoption of the 
Constitution, the work is still not complete but some important developments have been 
made during 2014, especially for what concern the Constitutional Court and the Court of the 
Inquiry. In general, in the Progress Report issued by the Commission in 2015 the 
implementation of the Constitution was still considered not done and the EU asked for an 
acceleration especially for the purpose of the establishment of a real plan with the civil 
society, equality between men and women, strengthen on the right of association, meeting 
and freedom of the press (European Commission: 4, 2015). What the Commission underlined 
about the half implementation of the Constitution is that the different motions written in the 
new Constitutional Chart, that assure the respect of fundamental freedoms and respect of 
Human Rights have to become operational as soon as possible. The request of the EU on an 
acceleration of the implementation of the Constitution is still waiting for a real fulfilment 
despite good progress. 
 
 
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
For what concern the possibility of assembly and manifestation the experts underlined in 
the 2012 Progress Report how in Morocco still many abuses were persecuted by the military 
forces. Albeit the New Constitution allows freedom of association and meetings, there are 
many difficulties in the application of those norms. In February 2012 the manifestations were 
allowed in order to let the citizens express their socio-economic claims but many cases of 
violence were registered between the Police and the citizens, after this accident the “February 
20 Movement” was cited as illegal by a Casablanca judge in 2012 (European Commission: 4, 
2013). Today Morocco is still not providing the right of manifestation and organization 
according to Freedom House, even if in 2014 a slightly improvement was reported in the 
matter of peaceful manifestation (Web Source: Freedom house/Morocco, 2015). The 
Administration still owns the right to prevent a manifestation if it is considered a problem for 
the public order. The main issue is that the Authority does not have to provide a clear 
motivation for the prevention and the Administrative Court takes too much time for the 
deliberation of a sentence in this matter. 
In the particular case of Freedom of Association, in 2012 many Organization of the Civil 
Society protested against the publication of a list of association that enjoyed public financing 
and in the Rabat Declaration the Public Organization asked a revision of the right of Freedom 
of Association. In Sum, according to the Progress Report issued in 2015 by the Commission, in 
2014 a slightly improvement was noticed for what concerned freedom of meeting and some 
manifestations took place in a peaceful manner. The EU expert, however, underlined how 
some pacifist organizations meetings were repressed and manifestations were prohibited 
without a clear motivation. The analysis of the state of Freedom of Association and Meeting 
provided by other observers like Human Right Watch denounce the blocking by the 
Authorities of gatherings organised by different Human Right Organization in Morocco, 
despite their legal status, as being against the law and against the provision of the New 
Constitution (Web Source: hrv/morocco.org). On the other side the EU leaves only a vague 
and blind eyed space for the address of this democratic violation pursued by the Moroccan 
Authorities. 
 
 
THE CODE OF PRESS AND THE MEDIA 
The Progress Report issued by the Commission in 2012 underlined that the right of 
freedom of expression is inserted in the new Constitution together with the Authority of 
Regulation but it is not really adopted. In fact even if journalists have the right to express their 
point of view in a critical manner, there have been several repressive methods and 
intimidations that are currently reported (European Commission: 2, 2012). In 2012 the EU 
asked the adoption of a Press Code in order to have a legislation on the laws that deprive 
freedom. In 2014 the Ministry of Communication submitted a new code for the press as asked 
by the EU, notably some progress were made after the Commission requests on the adoption 
of a Press Code. In October 2014, the Ministry of Communication announced three bills: on 
press and publishing, the status of professional journalists, and the National Press Council.  
According to the Commission the new code has some good features like the status of 
Professional Journalist and the National Council for the press, the new code does not allow the 
privation of freedom for the journalists but still allows sanctions on the penal code (European 
Commission: 4, 2015). Therefore Journalists are still objects of economic sanctions and 
repression and censure is still widely allowed.  
According to Freedom House, although the bills mark progress toward strengthening press 
freedom and access to information in Morocco, many of their provisions fall short of 
international standards.  Morocco nowadays, in the report on Freedom of the Press, in 
classified 136^ on a total of 179 countries (Web Source: Freedom House/ Morocco, 2015). 
 
 
JUSTICE REFORM 
From the Progress Report of 2012 the European experts advised Morocco on the need of a 
Justice Reform in order to respect the Rule of Law and, therefore, to enhance the credibility of 
the reforms. The EU also asserted to be willing to assist this reform but conditioning the aid to 
a real strategy and to a project of the Reform with clear objectives (European Commission: 2, 
2012).  
Starting from 2012 the EU decided to condition the aid for the Reform of Justice to the 
elaboration of a real strategy, with the establishment of a “Conséil Superieur du Pouvoir 
Judiciare” and the new Magistrate Status. In 2012 the Reform of Justice was finally adopted 
with several decrees published in the Official Bulletin. According to the Commission the 
Justice Reform has been an important challenge for the Moroccan’s Government. In 2015 
great progress were registered by the Commission in order to meet the European requests, in 
fact a project of norms for the “Conséil Superieur du Pouvoir Judiciare” was finally adopted 
and a project on the Status of the Magistrates was approved in the early 2015 (European 
Commision: 4, 2015). 
In Sum, the requests made by the Commission and the conditions attached to the European 
aid have been met by Morocco and some progress were made in the last three years in terms 
of Reform of the Judicial system. The EU, noteworthy, in line with the new benchmarks 
established in the Action Plan 2013-2017 underlines that, for what concerns the 2015 efforts 
in the area of Justice Reform Morocco should implement in a more effective manner the 
“Conséil superieur du pouvoir judiciare”, the civil and penal procedures and the Magistrates 
Status. 
 
 
CORRUPTION 
Corruption is still today widely considered a critical issue for Morocco. Even if many 
initiatives have been taken by the Government and the Organizations together with the EU 
experts for the fight against corruption, the perception of Morocco being a corrupted country 
is growing in the last years according to the data of Transparency International, ranking 
Morocco 80 out of 175 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International’s 
2014 Corruption Perceptions Index (Web Source: Transparency International). 
What is notably to underline for the purpose of this research is, however, the impact of the EU 
technical aid to the expert committees around Corruption. The “Instance central de 
prevention de la corruption” (ICPC) received 160,000€ from the EU in order to obtain a 
technical assistance for the elaboration of a Project of Law for the fight of corruption, this 
resulted in the publication of several amendments that aggravate the punishment of 
Magistrates and Public functionaries found guilty of corruption. Despite this success of the EU 
impact in fighting corruption in Morocco the new project of law adopted in summer 2015 has 
been criticised by the EU Commission and the local organization, Transparency Maroc, as 
being regressive vis-à-vis the latter version of the law, while according to the EU the new law 
project has two main “regressive” problems vis-à-vis the old version: the lack of pre-judicial 
investigation power and the auto-jurisdiction of the National Instance for the fight against 
corruption. In 2014 as already mentioned, according to Transparency International, Morocco 
was ranked 80 out of 175 countries for the perception of corruption and is notable to 
underline that in 2013 it was ranked 91, thus the general perception of corruption is actually 
increased. Morocco’s Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption found that 30% of 
Moroccans had to pay a bribe in order to access medical and health services. Possibly, one of 
the great impediment for a real eradication of corruption is the King. In fact, as Freedom 
House found out, is the king’s role in the economy, being the greatest stakeholder in public 
and private firms and one the wealthiest man in North Africa (Forbes) is a structural 
impediment for the reduction of corruption (Web Source: Freedom House/Morocco, 2015).  
 
 
DEATH PENALTY 
This chapter is quite a successful story in terms of norm approximation. Morocco is still 
applying a moratorium de facto on death penalty matter but in the last three years some 
changes have been done. In 2012 the EU Commission reported that Morocco did not adhere to 
the facultative protocol of the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights that 
concerns the abolition of death penalty and asked for compliance (European Commission: 2, 
2012). In February 2014, however, a network of lawyers gathered in order to intent a legal 
action against death penalty; this petition was supported by the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (IEDDH). As a response the National Human Rights Council of 
Morocco (CNDH) hosted, in June 20th 2014, a seminar on the death penalty, held in 
partnership with the Network of Lawyers against the Death Penalty. The participants, 
according to the documents issued by the CNDH, urged Morocco to ratify the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and abolish the death 
penalty, stressing that “it is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment that violates the most 
fundamental human rights: the right to life, protected under in the Moroccan constitution” 
(Web Source: CNDH.ma). In the aftermath of this action the Parliament welcomed, for the first 
time, a seminar on death penalty and some parliamentary groups, from both the majority and 
the opposition, agreed on a law proposal for the abolition of death penalty. According to the 
Commission the proposal for the abolition of Death Penalty is strongly supported by the 
Coalition Marocaine, the Council and the Network of Lawyers against the Death Penalty, 
representatives of the Network of Parliamentarians against the Death Penalty and the 
Moroccan Coalition for the Abolition of the Death Penalty and other civil society stakeholders, 
lawyers, jurists and artists. However the project reform of the penal code still contain death 
penalty but it stiffening the conditions for the request of the Capital punishment. 
 
 
EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 
This issue is a story of little success for what concern Morocco. The EU plan for the 
promotion of equity and equality between men and women, with a budget of 45 million€ was 
signed in July 2012 (European Commission: 2, 2012). In 2014 a law proposal for the 
elimination of all discriminations against women was officially deposed, while in February 
2014 the Parliament adopted an amendment of the penal code for the abolition of the disposal 
that allows a man to escape a sentence if he marries the woman victim of the rape. According 
to the international observer Freedom House the amend of Article 475 of the penal code, 
which stated that a rapist could escape prosecution if he marries his underage victim, 
maintains the prison terms but removes the possibility of exoneration (Web Source: Freedom 
House/Morocco, 2014). Controversy over the exoneration clause had raged since 2012, when 
16-year old Amina Filali committed suicide after she was forced to marry her rapist. Human 
rights and women’s rights activists lauded the amendment, but called for further reform to 
criminalize violence against women and raise penalties.  
Apart from this story of little improvement linked only on the law proposal, in Morocco 
women still face significant discrimination even if in the 2011 Constitution a progressive view 
is noticed on the aspect of gender equality. In fact in 2012 the Commission reported that 
Morocco, despite the removal of all reserves concerning the International Convention on the 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, CEDEF, had not finalized the project 
of law for the implementation of the Law on the violence against women and asked for an 
acceleration of the legislative procedure.  
In 2015 the Commission reported that, despite several recall on the need of the adoption of 
the law approving the facultative protocol of the Convention, it was not yet approved 
(European Commission: 4, 2015). 
 
 
MIGRATION 
For what concern migrants the abuses of Human Rights are still extensive. In Morocco, in 
fact, the great issue is about migrants who try to arrive in the north of the country in order to 
pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. The EU is engaged with Moroccan authorities giving 
financial support for the Organization working to help sub-saharian migrants. Even if in 
summer 2014 a new migration policy was launched by the Parliament, the migration flows 
are too high and the Government efforts to reduce human rights abuses are not sufficient. 
According to the Report issued by Freedom House on Morocco the EU is “turning a blind eye 
to Moroccan’s abuses” and the aid is not well directed (Web Source: Freedom 
House/Morocco, 2013). In 2012 the Progress Report on Morocco issued by the Commission 
underlined the EU efforts and financial aid for the organizations working with the 
subsaharina migrants in order to provide access to basic services but the Commission in 
particular underlined the need for an institutional plan to implement a juridical framework 
for the refugees. In 2015 the Commission focused on the promising new policy launched in 
2013 on migration but reported that the new procedure were not respected “for what 
concerned the expulsion of irregular migrants arrived in the north of the country” (European 
Commission: 4, 2015). It seems that only a superficial implementation of the reforms asked by 
the EU on the migrant and asylum matter has been done by the Moroccan government, 
continuing to violate human rights during the expulsion of migrants passing through the 
Moroccan territory. Freedom House reported that in the current situation the government has 
continued to accept aid from the European Union to stop migrants at the northern border 
with Ceuta and Melilla, as well as to thwart passage across the Strait of Gibraltar and the 
passage to the Canary Islands. Efforts by migrants to storm the fences in Ceuta and Melilla 
continue and Human rights abuses are extensive against the transient population (Web 
Source: Freedom House/Morocco, 2015 
 Conclusion 
The stories of Tunisia and Morocco can be labelled as consistent for what concern 
responses to the EU requests even if, for what concern the delays for the implementation of 
the newly reforms there is not so much evidence of successful achievements. In order to 
provide more consistent conclusions there is, therefore, the need to provide data with a 
higher level of disaggregation. Despite the lack of significant data this analysis of relevant 
documents and media reports provided a useful insight of the reforms made by Tunisia and 
Morocco 
 
In assessing the role played by the EU in promoting democratic changes in Tunisia and 
Morocco a first consideration has to be made on the role played by an external body of the EU, 
for instance the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission.  
This is, indeed, a successful story in terms of the Democracy promotion action of the EU and 
the perception of the European norms and values as being internationally recognised .  
The President of the NCA National Constituent Assembly, Mr Mustafa Ben Jaafer, requested 
the advisory body of the Council of Europe about the Tunisian Constitution drafting process. 
Apart from the conclusion of the Venice Commission, that considered the new Constitution as 
being modern and respectful of the international recognised Human Rights, democratic values 
and also new rights like the Environment protection (Venice Commission, 2013), the 
importance is the act of opinion request per se.  
Notwithstanding the Council of Europe cannot be considered as being part of the executive 
branch of the EU it represents, however, the European values and norms magnetism and the 
successful action in promoting democracy using the Soft Power of the advisory bodies such as 
the Venice Commission.  
 
The EU assisted Tunisia from the beginning, starting with the importance attached to the new 
Electoral Law and the new Constitution and the enforcement of the “Instance Publique 
indépendante”.  
Tunisia successfully engaged in this path for the enforcement of the Rule of Law that 
culminated with the adoption of the new Constitution, the establishment of a new Election 
Commission, and the formation of a politically neutral caretaker government under Prime 
Minister Mehdi Jomaa.  
In the positive relation between the EU monitoring and requests and the Tunisian norms 
adoption of the provisions envisioned by the EU for the Rule of Law, an important aspect is 
the one of the Venice Commission. 
 
What is impressive, though, in the analysis of the EU impact, is that the Commission almost 
stopped monitoring on the Freedom of Expression issue in Tunisia. Only in 2015 is possible to 
find in the Progress Report a mention to the need to implement the rights, expressed in the 
new Constitution, around Freedom of Expression (European Commission: 3, 2015). It seems 
that nowadays Tunisia has adopted a new and modern Constitution with great potential in 
terms of the establishment of Democracy, Rule of Law and respect of Human Rights, a new set 
of norms and values that are in the good way for a real process of democratization but, as in 
the case of Freedom of Expression, the implementation of those rights is not complete. In the 
country is reported, both by the EU Commission and by the international observers, that the 
right of freedom of expression in the field of media, printed press and internet, is not 
respected and journalists are still the target of governmental punishment. In this sense for 
what regards the Media, Tunisia established the “High independent authority for the 
audiovisual communication”, as requested by the EU, but on the other side improvements on 
the ground were not taken. In fact “defamation” is still widely applied today, especially versus 
journalistic reportages, in particular against those reporting on the conditions of workers or 
minorities. 
It is possible to conclude that the EU did not act in a coherent manner toward Tunisia for what 
concerns Freedom of expression and the media, only in a superficial way Tunisia responded 
to EU requests adopting the new Press Code and establishing the “High independent authority 
for the audiovisual communication”.  
For what concerns Justice the EU strongly engaged in requesting some changes to Tunisia. As 
already mentioned the new Constitution provides all the requirements the EU asked to the 
Country, the only issue reported was the delay to enforce the norms and effectively 
implement them. When in 2012 the Commission asked to adopt the legislative reforms in 
order to assure the independence of the Judiciary this motion was not listened and, the next 
year, the Progress Report was still reporting that Magistrates were nominated by the 
executive power. According to the Commission the reforms concerning the Judicial aspects 
were suspended in the precarious time frame of the elections of 2014 (European Commission: 
3, 2015). The Judicial issue, therefore, suffered from the importance given to the first 
democratic election of Tunisia and the entry into force of the new Electoral law and 
Constitution.  
It is possible to conclude that the Tunisian’s efforts to meet the requests of the EU for the 
constitutional reforms as well as those related to the Justice aspect have been met, they 
represent the will of the new Constitutional Assembly to engage in a democratization path 
together with the help of the EU and the European instruments for Democracy Promotion. 
 
For what concerns the aspect of Human Rights, in the case of Torture the EU acted more as 
a mediator in order to let Tunisia meet the international standard. In fact Tunisia adhered to 
the Rome Statute and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and the Bureau 
du Haut Commisaire aux Droits de l’Homme de Nations Unis was created in Tunis in 2011. It 
is possible to say, then, that Tunisia responded to the EU requests on Torture and after the 
ratification of the Protocol the EU monitored that Tunisian authorities were establishing the 
national mechanism for the prevention of torture (European Commission: 4, 2014).  
It is clearly thanks to the new Constitution that Tunisia has also been praised for relatively 
progressive social policies, but it is not only because of the new norms.  
In fact, for what concerns equality between women and men the 1956 status code, giving 
women same equality to men, has remained in force and today is further strengthen by the 
constitutional law that guarantees the legal gender equality. The EU action on this issue was 
to further improve an already well established right. In fact in 2012 the Commission experts 
asked the Tunisian Government to left all the reserves on the Convention on the elimination of 
all form of discrimination against women (CEDEF). Eventually the reserves on CEDEF were 
finally left in April 2014 (European Commission: 1, 2012). 
 
For what concern the adoption of the New Constitution, Morocco was positively reported 
by the EU experts because of the great majority of votes received (98%) assuring, in this way, 
stable and whole accepted values and principles. Morocco, additionally, was able to make fast 
improvements with the adoption of a new Constitutional Court and the Court of Inquiry. On 
the other side the EU frequently reported the delays for a real implementation of the 
constitutional laws, especially regarding those aspects related to equality between women 
and men, rights of association, meeting, manifestations and freedom of the press. In fact the 
current situation reported by the EU is that, despite the new formal constitutional laws that 
would assure the respect of the Rule of Law in terms of rights of manifestation, association 
and gathering, those rights are not actually respected. Morocco, in fact, has made good 
progress in the last four years on the formal aspect but in practice is not respecting the Rule of 
Law. What the EU reported is the difficulty in the application and enforcement of the new 
Laws, the Administration therefore still owns the rights to forbid a public manifestation if it is 
considered not in line with the public order’s standards.  
What the EU underlined in the last Country Report was the abuse by the public Authorities of 
this “right” in order to block manifestations organized by the Civil Society without giving 
motivations. For what concern the European side since 2011 the Commission reported about 
the lack of a real implementation of the constitutional law on freedom of association, 
manifestation and freedom of the press, requesting a real adaptation of those norms with the 
new benchmark provided in the New Constitution (European Commission: 2, 2012). 
International observers, like the organization Freedom House, underlined how the EU actually 
gave a “blind eye” on those Moroccan’s violations, namely not applying any type of negative 
conditionality in response of the monitored abuses (Web Source: Freedom House/Morocco, 
2015). In the same way, for what concerns Freedom of the Press, Morocco made some 
positive changes with the adoption of a new Press Code, as requested by the EU Commission, 
but on the other side the international observers still report widely violations of the new rules 
on censorships and freedom of expression. It is possible to infer, hence, that on one side there 
was the European impact on the new Constitution for what concern the norms adopted in 
term of Rule of Law, namely the new Constitutional Law, the socio-economic freedoms 
expressed in the Constitutional Laws and the new Press Code. On the other side the 
democratization process is still incomplete and the EU is not applying serious Conditionality 
for the respect of those values that are, albeit noteworthy, inserted in the Constitution.  
 
A story of success around the EU impact is the one of Justice Reform of Morocco.  
In fact, in 2012, the Commission decided to condition the aid for the Moroccan’s Justice 
Reform to the establishment of a strategy with clear objectives especially characterized by the 
establishment of the Magistrate Status and the “Conséil Superieur du Pouvoir Judiciare”. 
 In 2015 the Progress Report actually reported the adoption of those two pillars, as requested 
by the EU (European Commission: 4, 2015); the impact is, thus, evident as a result of a clear 
European policy, with clear objectives and with the condition of the aid to a strategic plan. 
It is possible to label the case of Corruption in Morocco as the prevalence of the Context 
variable vis-à-vis the EU pressure. In fact the Commission acted in a positive way toward 
Morocco in order to tackle the issue of Corruption providing financial and technical aid for the 
elaboration of a project of law. The new Law, designed in order to aggravate the punishment 
for the public administration found guilty of corruption, in practice resulted regressive 
compared to the former one. Therefore Corruption in Morocco is still considered the central 
issue of Morocco’s Rule of Law and the public perception of Corruption is even grown in the 
last years according to the international survey Transparency International (Web Source: 
Transparency International). In this case is not possible to accuse the inadequate European 
action in fighting against corruption, what is necessary is to take into consideration the 
presence of the context variable, i.e. the King and the King’s court. Freedom House underlined 
how the King is, actually, an impediment for the eradication of corruption in Morocco most 
notably because of the wealth of the royal family with a stake in most of the public and private 
firms of the country (Web Source: Freedom House/Morocco, 2015). Moreover, from an US 
point of view, according to the United States State Department published by Wikileaks we are 
able to know how the US Embassy in Rabat considered that corruption is prevalent at all 
levels in the Moroccan Society considering one of the greatest impediment the economic 
interests of the royal family in all level of the Moroccan’s economy (Web Source: The 
Guardian). A possible solution is to invest in the socialization aspect promoting a culture of 
honesty and honour that would spread from the Civil Society. 
 
Indeed, for what concerns Human Rights and in particular Death Penalty, the EU worked 
together with the Civil Society triggering a bottom-up action for the elimination of the capital 
punishment and the approximation to the international norms on this matter. In fact, the 
petition for the abrogation of Death Penalty was successfully supported by the EIDHR, 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (Web Source: eidhr.eu/Morocco). At 
last, Morocco responded to the European requests in terms of Migration Policy and the EU is 
still financially contributing to help the organization that work with the migrants arriving in 
the north of Morocco. Despite the efforts and the norm adopted by the Government the 
migration issue is still a difficult one and many Human Rights abuses against those trying to 
arrive to Ceuta and Melilla are frequently reported. For what concerns Equality between 
women and men Morocco seemed to have responded to the EU requests and financial 
commitment; in fact the EU plan of 45 million€ signed in 2012 eventually spilled over in a law 
proposal for the elimination of all discrimination against women and the consequent 
amendment of the Penal Code for the abolition of the disposal that allows a man to escape a 
sentence if he marries the woman victim of the rape. But this law amendment did not resulted 
in a significant improvement of the women condition in Morocco. It is possible to infer, 
therefore, that this is a case in which only a superficial improvement was resulted in the 
aftermath of the EU pressure on Human Rights and even a technical aid has not resulted in the 
spill over effect of Socialization, remaining only a successful story on the Norm level. 
 
Morocco is therefore on the path of democratization, having registered several adaptations to 
the EU requests in terms of Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights. The democratization 
impact and the EU Commission efforts in promoting certain values and helping to meet 
certain international benchmarks is incontrovertible as well as the importance of other 
variables. In fact, in the reforms analysed, it is possible to evaluate that despite the causal 
relation between certain EU actions and the Morocco’s reforms other forces, whether 
domestic, regional or international played an active role. This responds to the hypothesis 
formulated in this research according to which Morocco was reported to be economically 
linked to the US and France and the domestic presence of the Islamic parties and the King 
were context variable to take into consideration when dealing with the control of the 
European democratic impact. 
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